

**“Police Reforms in Peace Agreements, 1975 – 2011:
Introducing the PRPA dataset”**

Online Supplementary Appendix

Overview

- I. Variable codings based on secondary sources
- II. Variable distributions
- III. Context Conditions of Police Reform in Peace Agreements: Additional Tables and Figures

I. Variables coded based on secondary sources

As mentioned in the text, some peace agreements made reference to “security forces” in general. To determine whether the term “security forces” included the police, we checked other peace agreements (to which the peace agreement that was coded made reference) or, if that did not yield any results, consulted secondary sources. The table below lists all peace agreements in which this was the case.

PAID	Name	PA_name	Year	Row in PRPA Dataset	Variables affected by coding based on secondary sources	Sources used for positive coding
79020061 12101	Nepal: government	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	2006	70	Police accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USSD report for Nepal (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper) • Bohara et al., "Opportunity, Democracy, and the Exchange of Political Violence: A Subnational Analysis of Conflict in Nepal," JCR 50:1 (2006).
45020030 61701	Liberia: government	Accra Ceasefire Agreement	2003	92	Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accra Peace Agreement, PAID: 4502003081801
51620021 20201	Burundi: government	Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD	2002	180	Capacity, Training, Composition, Composition: Warring parties, International presence: monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arusha Peace Agreement, PAID: 5162000082801
51620060 61801	Burundi: government	Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability	2006	184	Human Rights standards, International Presence: Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi, PAID: 5162003110201
51620060 90701	Burundi: government	Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL	2006	185	Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi, PAID: 5162003110201

II. Variable distributions

Figure A.1 visualizes the distribution of variable codings in our dataset (the numbers correspond to the numbers in Table 1 in the main text. Figure A.2 compares the occurrence of police reform in peace agreements to other, popular provisions (see section “Trends and Patterns of Police Reform in Peace Agreements” in the main text).

Figure A.1. Variable distributions





Figure A.2. Comparison of Police Provisions to other Provisions in Peace Agreements



III. Context Conditions of Police Reform in Peace Agreements: Additional Tables and Figures

The coefficient plot (Figure 3 in the main text) is based on the model estimation in Table A.2.

Table A.2. Context conditions of police reform in peace agreements

	Model 1
Political Terror Scale (5-year avg. prior to PA)	0.55 [*] (0.23)
Conflict Intensity	0.21 (0.17)
DDR Provision in PA	1.55 ^{***} (0.35)
Territorial Conflict	1.20 [*] (0.47)
Freedom House score in year of PA	-0.32 [*] (0.14)
UN: Trad./Obs. (1 year prior to PA)	0.14 (0.36)
UN: Enf./Multi. (1 year prior to PA)	1.25 [*] (0.54)
Intercept	-2.87 [*] (0.95)
AIC	231.63
BIC	257.73
Log Likelihood	-107.81
Deviance	215.63
Num. obs.	193

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Dependent variable: Inclusion of police reform in peace agreement (binary). Standard errors in parentheses and clustered by conflict.

To illustrate the substantive relationship between specific context conditions and the inclusion of police reform in peace agreements, the plots on the following page estimate predicted probabilities as response to changes in the covariates / context conditions in Table A.2. To simulate predicted probabilities we held all continuous variables at their median and all categorical variables at their mode.

Figure A.3. Predicted probabilities of the inclusion of police reform

