Partially part of the project, partially precursor to it is my dissertation with the title:
“Buying Democracy? The Political Economy of Foreign Aid, Power-Sharing and Post-Conflict Political Development”
**Abstract/Summary**: How does development aid shape the prospect for democracy after violent intrastate conflicts? Building on a novel political economy theory of post-conflict politics, this article argues that political aid conditionalities and recipient elites' economic utility from office give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma: Post-conflict elites can democratize, enjoy continued access to aid rents, but risk uncertainty over office---or they refuse to democratize, risk aid withdrawal, but have a higher chance to remain in office. This dilemma is strongest in the context of power-sharing cabinets: By granting formerly excluded rebel groups access to the state budget, power-sharing governments intensify elites’ rent-seeking motives. As a result of this dilemma, large aid flows to post-conflict power-sharing governments have a heterogeneous effect on post-conflict democracy. On the one hand, power-sharing elites will comply with aid conditionalities and hold clean elections. On the other hand, elites are likely resort to other tactics to hold on to power and win elections, such as limiting judicial independence and steering private goods to politically important groups. To test this argument empirically, I combine data on aid flows and rebel participation in power-sharing cabinets with indicators for democratization, election quality, rule of law, and public goods provision for all post-conflict countries between 1990 and 2010. Results from a wide range of statistical models support my argument. The findings have implications for aid effectiveness research, peacebuilding debates, and the study of democratization more broadly.
Haass, Felix / Ottmann, Martin. “Rebels, Revenue, and Redistribution. The Political Geography of Post-conflict Power-sharing.” Under Review
Haass, Felix / Ottmann, Martin. “Profits from Peace. The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Post-Conflict Corruption.” Accepted for publication in World Development
(with Nadine Ansorg)
Can well-equipped and well-trained United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops better protect civilians from violence in civil conflicts than troops without adequate military equipment? Evidence from the Central African Republic or the DR Congo indicates that it is not only troop size or diversity that contains violence against civilians, but that equipment and training affect peacekeeper’s capacity to respond to violence. We argue that peace operations with a large share of troops from countries with high quality militaries are better able to deter violence from state and non-state actors, create buffer zones within conflict areas, can better reach remote locations, and have superior capabilities to monitor the implementation of peace agreements. These operational advantages enable them to better protect civilians. Combining data from military expenditures of troop contributing countries together with monthly data on the composition of peace operations, we create a proxy indicator for the average troop equipment of UN PKOs. Statistical evidence from an extended sample of conflicts in Africa and Asia between 1991 and 2010 supports our argument. Our results stay robust when using matching and fixed effects models.
Haass, Felix / Nadine Ansorg. “Better Peacekeepers, better protection? Troop equipment of United Nations peace operations and violence against civilians” Draft Paper.
Ansorg, Nadine / Haass, Felix. 2016. “Country Profile: Germany.” Providing for Peacekeeping - Troop Contributor Country Profiles.
Ansorg, Nadine / Haass, Felix. 2013. Multilaterale Friedenssicherung in Afrika. GIGA Focus Afrika, 6. [Additional data and graphics (blog post).]
(with Nadine Ansorg and Julia Strasheim)
Both donors and local peacebuilders typically assume that an impartial and effective police is one of the key requisites for peace after civil conflict. Yet we lack a systematic and comparative empirical evaluation of this commonly held belief. In this project, we seek to narrow this gap. To what extent do conflict actors themselves consider police reform as an issue to include in peace talks? What determines this decision? Why are police reforms that were agreed upon in a peace agreement in some cases implemented while in other cases they are not? And finally, is successful police reform linked to the survival of peace after conflict? To answer these questions, we collect data on type and extent of police reform in peace agreements and their subsequent implementation. In future steps we seek to find correlates of inclusion of police reform in peace agreements as well as determinants of their implementation.
Ansorg, Nadine / Haass, Felix / Strasheim, Julia. 2016. “Police Reforms in Peace Agreements, 1975-2011: Introducing the PRPA dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 53(4): 597-607. [ Replication Data] [ Online Appendix] [ Manuscript]
Haass, Felix / Strasheim, Julia. / Ansorg, Nadine. 2016. “The International Dimension of Post-Conflict Police Reform.” In: Ansorg, Nadine / Kurtenbach, Sabine (eds.) Institutional Reforms and Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 163-190. [ Replication Data]